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CROSS-EXAMINATION

N.Y CONST. art. I, § 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to ... be confronted with the witnesses against
him ....

U.S. CONST. amend. VT:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses againsthim ....
COURT OF APPEALS

People v. Eastman I
(decided February 21, 1995)

Defendant Cecilio Eastman collaterally attacked his murder
conviction on the ground that it abridged his Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation 2 as defined in the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Cruz v. New York. 3 In Cruz, the Court

held that "the Confrontation Clause bars the introduction of a
confession of a nontestifying co-defendant, not directly
4
admissible against the defendant, that inculpates the defendant."
In People v. Eastman, the New York Court of Appeals concluded
that Cruz applied retroactively 5 and that the admission of the codefendant's inculpatory statement into evidence was harmful
6
error which entitled Eastman to a new trial.

1. 85 N.Y.2d 265, 648 N.E.2d 459, 624 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1995).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause provides in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.... "

Id. N.Y.

CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "In any trial in any
court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to... be confronted with
the witnesses against him." Id.
3. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
4. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 268, 648 N.E.2d at 460, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
5. Id. at 276, 648 N.E.2d at 465, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
6. Id. at 278, 648 N.E.2d at 466, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
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In Eastman, a Con Edison security guard, Wilfred Barrett, was
fatally shot during an attempted robbery. 7 Barrett told a police
officer at the crime scene that he may have shot one of his
assailants during the robbery attempt. 8 While he was lying on the
ground suffering from a gunshot wound, the police brought a
suspect back to the scene who Barrett identified as one of the
assailants. 9 This suspect was later found not to be involved in the
robbery attempt. 10
Barrett died later at the hospital while receiving treatment in
the emergency room. 11 Contemporaneously, the detective
assigned to Barrett's case was informed that the defendant,
Eastman, was also being treated in the emergency room for a
gunshot wound he claimed he sustained in the same area where
Barrett was fatally shot. 12 Surgery performed on Eastman yielded
a bullet that was later identified as a bullet discharged from
Barrett's gun. 13
While in the hospital, the detective noticed three individuals,
Carlos Croney, Carlos Richards and Rubin Charles, waiting in
the emergency room area. 14 Believing that the three men might
have information relating to the shooting, the detective had them
brought to the precinct for questioning. 15 The detective
discovered through interrogation that Croney, Richards and
Eastman fled the crime scene in the same car and that the weapon
used in Barrett's shooting was dropped off at Charles's
apartment, where it was later recovered by the police. 16
During the questioning by the detective, co-defendant Croney
provided the following statement:

7. Id. at 268, 648 N.E.2d at 460-61, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 268-69, 648 N.E.2d at 461, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 269, 648 N.E.2d at 461, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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[Eastman] told me to stop the car... and wait. [Eastman] got
out the car with [Richards] .... I heard more than one shot.
[Richards] and [Eastman] came running back. [Eastman] told me
he was shot. When they got out of the car, they had told me stop
we see something. Either [Richards] or [Eastman] said we going
to take the man off. When they came back [Richards] said the
man shot [Eastman]. I took them to the hospital and drove off.
17
The black gun was on the front seat of the car.

The defendant Eastman was questioned twice by the detective
in the hospital on the day of the robbery. 18 During the second
questioning, an assistant district attorney and a stenographer were

also present. 19
Subsequently, Eastman and Croney were jointly indicted for
murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon
in the second degree "under the theory that they were 'aiding the

other and acting in concert with another person' in an attempt to
commit a robbery, and in furtherance of such crime fatally shot
Wilfred Barrett." 2 0

17. Id.
18. Id. During the initial questioning, the defendant stated that "he was in
the car with Croney, who was driving, that Croney dropped him off, he heard
a shot and that he sustained a gunshot wound." Id. at 269-70, 648 N.E.2d at
461, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 85. The defendant maintained that three anonymous
persons "transported him to the hospital." Id. at 270, 648 N.E.2d at 461, 624
N.Y.S.2d at 85.
19. Id. At the second questioning, the defendant stated that both Croney
and Richards were in the car with him and that Richards wanted to steal an
envelope which was in Barrett's possession. Id. He also stated that both
Richards and himself exited the car and that it was Richards who attempted to
take the envelope from Barrett. Id. Eastman claimed that while he was walking
towards the encounter, he heard a gun shot and turned to run away. Id. at 270,
648 N.E.2d at 461-62, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 85-86. At that point, he realized he
had been shot. Id. at 270, 648 N.E.2d at 462, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 86. As he ran
away, Eastman told Croney he had been shot and asked Croney to take him to
the hospital. Id. While being interrogated, Eastman denied that he ever had a
gun, and that he asked anyone to "do a job with him and Croney," or that he
saw Croney with a gun. Id. Following the detective's line of questioning,
Eastman was arrested. Id.
20. Id. at 270-71, 648 N.E.2d at 462, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
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Before trial, Eastman argued that under Bruton v. United
States,2 1 severance of his case from co-defendant Croney's was

required to avoid abridging his right of confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, since Croney
refused to testify at trial. 22 Eastman claimed his statement related
to his "defense that Richards committed the crime while he
merely exited the car to see what was happening with
Richards." 23 The court refused to sever the cases. 24 Further, the
court ruled that the co-defendant's statement (that he saw the
defendant carry the gun back to the co-defendant's vehicle after
25
the shoot-out and place it on the front seat) be omitted.
In charging the jury, the court instructed them that Croney's
26
statement could only be used against Croney and not Eastman.
Both Eastman and Croney were convicted of murder and criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree. 27 The judgment
28
was affirmed by the appellate division.
Eastman moved to vacate his conviction under Cruz v. New
York. 2 9 In Cruz, the United States Supreme Court held that

21. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, a witness testified that the codefendant made an oral confession to him, stating that he and the defendant
committed an armed robbery. Id. at 124. Both the co-defendant and the
defendant were convicted of the crime. Id. The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 124-25. However, the United States
Supreme Court overturned the defendant's conviction, holding that "because of
the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to
the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining [the defendant's]
guilt, admission of [the co-defendant's] confession in [the] joint trial violated
[the defendant's] right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 126.
22. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 271, 648 N.E.2d at 462, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 272, 648 N.E.2d at 462, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
27. Id. at 273, 648 N.E.2d at 463, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
28. Id.
29. 481 U.S. 186 (1987). In Cruz, co-defendant Eulogio Cruz told
Norberto Cruz of his involvement in a robbery which resulted in his
commission of murder. Co-defendant Benjamin Cruz relayed a similar
description of the event to Norberto. Id. at 188. Subsequently, Benjamin Cruz
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"where a nontestifying co-defendant's confession incriminating
the

defendant

is not directly admissible against the
defendant,... the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at
their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it
against the defendant, and even if the defendant's own confession
is admitted against him." 30 Eastman argued that Cruz should be
applied retroactively, and if applied in the instant case, would
mandate reversal of his conviction. 3 1 Eastman's motion was
denied and the appellate division affirmed. 32 The court of appeals
granted leave and reversed the appellate division's ruling. 33
The court of appeals considered Eastman's claim pursuant to
Teague v. Lane,34 where the United States Supreme Court held
that "new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are applied
retrospectively.., where the new rule alters a bedrock
procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial." 35 Based on the
rule set forth in Teague, the Eastman court noted that "Cruz
unquestionably departs from established precedent, and
implicates a bedrock procedural element - the Sixth Amendment

confessed to police that he and three other co-defendants committed the
robbery and that he had committed the murder. Id. The confession was later
videotaped. Id. Both Eulogio and Benjamin Cruz were jointly tried for felony
murder. Id. at 189. At trial, Benjamin's videotaped confession was introduced
with a limiting instruction that it was only to be used against Benjamin, not
Eulogio. Id. Additionally, Norberto's testimony regarding the co-defendants
conversation with him about the incident was also admitted. Id. However, at
the end of the trial, "Norberto's testimony stood as the only evidence
admissible against Eulogio that directly linked him to the crime." Id. Both codefendants were convicted and Eulogio's conviction was affirmed by the court
of appeals. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded
Eulogio's conviction. Id. at 193.
30. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 273, 648 N.E.2d at 463, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 87
(quoting Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
35. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 275, 648 N.E.2d at 465, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989).
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right of confrontation." 36 Because the rule of Cruz is essential to
a reliable conclusion of guilt or innocence, the Court found that
the introduction of the co-defendant's incriminating "confession
against the defendant undermined the fundamental fairness of the
trial, where, as here, there was no opportunity for
cross-examination to test the reliability of the co-defendant's
confession. ' 37 Thus, the court in Eastman concluded that on
collateral review of a conviction, the constitution mandates
retroactive application of the rule in Cruz.3 8
After determining that Cruz must be applied retroactively, the
court then considered the issue of whether the admission of codefendant Croney's statement into evidence constituted harmless
error. 39 When reviewing a constitutional error, the court must
examine the entire record and must determine if the "confession
so prejudiced the defendant that reversal of the conviction and a
new trial is mandated." 40 The court must consider a number of
factors, including the thoroughness of the "defendant's statement
and the extent to which it explains defendant's participation in the
crime without reference to the co-defendant's statement; whether
the statement is corroborated or contradicted by objective
evidence; and, whether defendant has repeated or repudiated the
1
substance of the statement on subsequent occasions.,, 4
An issue particularly noteworthy in the court's review of the
error found in Eastman was "the impact of the co-defendant's
inculpatory statement on defendant's repudiation of his previous
statements."42 During the trial, Eastman disavowed any criminal
involvement in the event in question and renounced the
incriminating statements made to the detective or assistant district
attorney at the hospital, on the grounds that they were
involuntary and unreliable "since they were obtained when his
physical and mental capabilities were severely impaired after a
36.
37.
38.
39.

Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 276, 648 N.E.2d at 465, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id.

40. Id. at 276-77, 648 N.E.2d at 465, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
41. Id. at 277, 648 N.E.2d at 466, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
42. Id.
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seven-hour operation." 43 The Eastman court indicated that "the
probable impact of the co-defendant's inculpatory statement on
the mind of the average juror was extreme prejudice to
defendant, eliminating any possibility that the jury would accept
the defense theory."44

According to the court, co-defendant Croney's incriminating
statement maintained Eastman's "conviction under a theory that
each defendant was 'aiding the other and acting in concert with
another' because only the co-defendant's statement links
defendant to the crime and ascribes intent to him."45 The
defendant's statements have only placed him near the scene of the
crime without explaining his presence "nor reveal a plan or
motive to commit a crime." 46 The court found that it was the
"comprehensive nature of the co-defendant's statement that
provide[d] the only support for defendant's conviction." 47
Furthermore, the court noted that although Barrett's hearsay
statement that he possibly shot a suspect accounts for the bullet
recovered from defendant's abdomen, without Croney's
statement, "it too does nothing other than place defendant at the
scene, a fact not changed by the ballistics evidence .... "48 The
court found that "the accuracy of Barrett's statement is itself
hardly free from doubt given that the dying Barrett identified an
alleged suspect who was not even at the scene.-49
Therefore, the court determined that Eastman's conviction was
in violation of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when
the co-defendant's incriminating statement was admitted into
evidence. 50 The court held that this ruling constituted harmful
error and thus, mandated that the defendant be afforded a new
trial. 5 1
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

48. Id. at 277-78, 648 N.E.2d at 465, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
49. Id. at 278, 648 N.E.2d at 465, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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The approaches used by federal and New York courts under
their respective constitutions 52 differ with regard to the reliability
of nontestifying co-conspirator's statements. In Ohio v.
Roberts,53 the United States Supreme Court established that when
an out-of-court statement is sought to be introduced against a
criminal defendant, the Confrontation Clause requires that the
prosecutor either produce the out of court declarant for in court
cross-examination 54 or show that he made reasonable efforts to
produce the declarant, 55 and the statement must bear sufficient
indicia of reliability. 5 6 Sufficient indicia of reliability can be
presumed when the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception or if "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" are
shown. 57 In United States v. Inadi,58 the Court also held that the
Confrontation Clause does not require the prosecutor to show that

the nontestifying co-conspirator is unavailable as a condition
precedent to admitting the co-conspirator's out-of-court statement
at trial. 59 The Court distinguished Inadi from Roberts by stating
that Roberts pertained to testimony from a prior judicial
proceeding while Inadi pertained to out-of-court statements by
co-conspirators. 60 Furthermore, under Bouraily v. United
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause provides in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6. The New York provision states: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person
and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature of the
cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
53. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, the preliminary hearing testimony of a
declarant who was absent from the defendant's trial was admitted into
evidence. Id.
54. Id. at 65.
55. Id. at 74.
56. Id. at 66.
57. Id.
58. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
59. Id. at 400.
60. Id. at 393-94. Depending on the type of statement in question,
different principles may apply. Id. at 395. In the case of former testimony,
"when two versions of the same evidence are available, longstanding principles
of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis,
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States, 6 1 the Supreme Court held that "the co-conspirator

exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence
that, under this Court's holding in Roberts, a court need not
independently inquire into the reliability of such statements." 62
However, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v.
Sanders,63 adopted the Roberts test, stating "we need not and do
not adopt in this case a rule by which every extrajudicial
statement qualifying under [the co-conspirator] exception to the
hearsay rule is admissible at a criminal trial notwithstanding the
constitutional right of confrontation. "6 4 Although Sanders was
decided over a decade ago, it is still considered good law. 65 The
court of appeals has not proffered any reason to believe the
approach taken in Sanders is no longer applicable. 6 6 In People v.
Persico,6 7 the Appellate Division, First Department, stated that
favor the better evidence." Id. at 394. However, "if the declarant is
unavailable, no 'better' version of the evidence exists, and the former
testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live testimony on the same
point." Id. at 394-95. Additionally, Roberts "rested in part on the strong
similarities between prior judicial proceedings and the trial." Id. at 395. In the
case of co-conspirators statements, "[b]ecause they are made while the
conspiracy is in progress, such statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's
context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same
matters in court." Id. Hence, it is likely that co-conspirators will speak
differently amongst themselves than they would when they are on the stand at
trial. Id. Furthermore, the positions of the co-conspirators have presumably
changed between the time the statements were made and at trial, thus lessening
the likelihood that any in-court testimony would "recapture the evidentiary
significance of statements made when the conspiracy was operating in full
force." Id.
61. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
62. Id. at 183.
63. 56 N.Y.2d 51, 436 N.E.2d 480, 451 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1982).
64. Id. at 64, 436 N.E.2d at 486, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
65. People v. Persico, 157 A.D.2d 339, 345, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262, 266 (1st
Dep't 1990).
66. Id. at 344, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
67. 157 A.D.2d 339, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262 (lst Dep't 1990). In Persico, the
First Department noted that the most frequently adopted reasoning for
explaining the hearsay exception is not reliability but rather an agency theory,
estopping co-conspirators from disavowing statements made by other coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 347, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
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the co-conspirator exception's "vintage alone does not warrant
characterizing it as 'firmly rooted.' '"68 Thus under Sanders, "if
the declarant is available, he or she will testify and the hearsay
will be admitted. "69 However, "[i]f the declarant is unavailable,
70
the hearsay will be admitted anyway, provided it is reliable. "
Thus, when comparing the Confrontation Clause under both

federal and New York
of the reliability of a
because it is within a
under New York law,

law, under the Federal Constitution, proof
co-conspirator's statement is not required
firmly rooted hearsay exception, whereas
the reliability is not necessarily present in

each circumstance and thus, must be proven on a case-by-case
71
basis.

However, the court denounced such reasoning by finding that the rules of
agency "are involved in determining against whom the evidence may be
admitted... and not relevant in determining why it should be admitted." Id.
68. Id. at 348, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
69. Id. at 349, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
70. Id.
71. People v. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d 51, 65, 436 N.E.2d 480, 486 451
N.Y.S.2d 30, 36 (1982). The Sanders court listed the following five factors it
utilized to determine the reliability of the co-conspirator's statement: (1) it was
recorded on tape leaving no question that the declarant made such statements,
(2) the declarant had personal knowledge of the issues he stated and thus "no
possibility that his statements were based on faulty recollection," (3) the
declarant had no reason to fabricate at the time he made the statements "since
he believed that he was speaking in confidence to a cohort engaged in a joint
enterprise," (4) the statements were independently corroborated, and (5) the
statements directly incriminated the declarant "in a joint criminal enterprise
[thus] provid[ing] additional assurance of their trustworthiness." Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/3

10

